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This interesting paper can be read as making (at least) two important points. First, it 
shows that mandatory arrest laws (MAL) in cases of domestic violence have been counter 
productive on at least one dimension, namely the frequency of serious abuse cases. 
Second, it shows that the method used for evaluating alternative policies against crime 
that has become the golden standard in criminology (and economics), namely randomized 
evaluation, can be seriously misleading. While I appreciate that the first contribution is 
important, particularly from the point of view of practice, I believe the second point has 
important consequences for the way we approach the policy evaluation more generally.  
 
Let me start with the first point raised in the paper. It establishes that the moment when 
laws requesting the arrest of those accused of participating in domestic abuse is passed, 
average intimate homicides in the state (per capita) increases while that of family-
member homicide falls. The effect is very large. And the difference in difference 
approach helps considerably in establishing the causal connection between the laws and 
the separation in the frequency of the two types of domestic abuse. Figure 1 illustrates.   
 
The suggested interpretation is this: mandatory arrest laws reduce reporting by the victim 
(since it is more costly), so it escalates to homicide more often. Familial homicide drops 
because there is more reporting. The difference is presumed to occur because reporting of 
familial violence is made by non-victims (e.g., teachers). This puts the focus on reporting, 
something for which we unfortunately get no data.  One alternative is to see if the 
response is particularly large in states with more serious punishments. There are 
differences in the severity of sentencing across states and over time (one example, of 
course is the death penalty). This is particularly important with the appearance of three-
strikes-and-you-are-out laws. A similar point suggests that groups that are incarcerated at 
higher rates might be more inclined to reduce reporting in response to MAL. Incidentally, 
the similarity in response rates across racial groups is perhaps troubling for those who 
believe both in the results of this paper and the presence of racial bias in the legal system. 
So one reason this is an important paper is because it asks us to think harder about 
theories of reporting, which is an extremely important and understudied topic.  
 
My second point is that the paper is making a point that far exceeds the issue of 
mandatory arrest laws. Indeed, I think it shows that randomized experiments are often not 
particularly useful in the analysis of policies against crime because we can’t be sure about 
the quantity of information in the hands of the public. We typically want to look at 
incentives. But to study them, people must know about the different penalties they face. 
But if the criminals know, then the public will know. And they may not be keen on 
allowing randomization of penalties. Thus, the paper suggests that there are limits to the use of randomized experiments in policy evaluation that we urgently need to understand 
better.  
 
As the author reminds us, mandatory arrest laws were passed in the US in response to the 
results of the influential Minnesota Domestic Violence Experiment (MDVE). In it, the 
type of police intervention (arrest for at least one night, arrest and immediate release and 
simple warning plus reading of the rights of the victim) following the report of an 
incident, was randomized. The study revealed large drops in future domestic violence 
following arrest. Now, Iyengar’s paper shows that it is wrong to extrapolate these results 
to justify MAL because they were obtained conditional on reporting. The public in 
general, and women in particular, were not informed of this experiment. The key point of 
the paper is that this difference is significant because of behavioral differences that may 
arise in the relationship between the battered women and their abuser.  
 
Now the question is whether we can avoid this problem in the future by designing better 
studies. I am pessimistic for one simple reason: I do not think that the lack of external 
validity of the Minnesota experiment was the result of an avoidable mistake. It seems to 
me that it would have been impossible to communicate widely to women and other 
potential victims about the random nature of the program. And without such 
communication, incentives cannot be studied. I know that randomization of the treatment 
is standard in the scientific evaluation of the effectiveness of medicines. And that patients 
fully accept this. But it is also true that they voluntarily sign in to participate in such 
clinical trials. More importantly, we currently do not know much about the settings where 
the public will allow randomization of policies. 
 
Public reaction to randomized experiments 
 
It is of course hard to know if the public holds such heterogeneous preferences over the 
domain over which it is appropriate to conduct scientific evaluation of policies through 
randomized trials. But given that it seems important for us to know where people actually 
accept randomization and where they do not, I have run a small scale survey asking high 
school students (15-16 year olds) in Argentina the following two questions: 
 
  
1.  In the US there have been two recent studies. In one, in order to find out if a 
certain medicine was appropriate in fighting cancer it had to be administered to 
only half of a group of patients (the other half receiving nothing). In order to 










2.  In the other (also in the US), in order to find out if a certain punishment was 
appropriate in fighting crime it had to be given to only half of a group of criminals (while the other half received a lower sentence). In order to decide 






A sample of 18 high school students were interviewed (one on one). The results are as 
follows:  
 
Question 1: Yes=14, No=4  
Question 2: Yes=0, No=18 
 
Given the cheap design, the results are obviously just suggestive. Still, they suggest that 
randomization is not supported in the evaluation of some policies designed to reduce 
crime. One possible explanation is that in the medical context it is a single agent decision 
problem. There is a procedure being considered and the person making the decision to 
engage in the trial bears all the potential costs. In the crime context there are also victims 




In brief, my point is that the paper shows that one of the most interesting and influential 
randomized experiments that we have available to inform the design of policy in the area 
of crime fails in some important way. And that the reason it fails is not because of a 
mistake that can easily be avoided in the future, but rather because experiments are not 
particularly useful in important areas in crime. Indeed, it is useful to remember that 
experiments in medicine hope to uncover the effect of a medicine on a person. In 
contrast, in economics, we are often interested in the effect of how affecting one person 
changes the incentives that other people have for engaging in specific behaviors. And it is 
precisely that “external” aspect that the public might refuse to study using randomized 
experiments.  
 
                                                 
1 Incidentally, this would favor retribution vs deterrence as positive theories of punishment, as in Di Tella 
and Dubra (2008).   